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Introduction
The causes of the current Darfur problem can be justifiably reduced to one 
word: ‘injustice’. Since the independence of Sudan in 1956, the region of Darfur 
has been under the oppressive hegemony of a ruling elite primarily drawn from 
the northern region of Sudan. Over the years, Darfur people protested their 
economic, cultural, ethnic and political marginalisation to no avail. In 2003, 
some Darfur people took up arms against the Khartoum government (El-Tom, 
2009, 2011; Hassan and Ray, 2009).
It is now 10 years since the onset of Darfur atrocities. One does not have to 
subscribe to clichés of conflict maturity or war fatigue to realise that the Darfur 
crisis is approaching its end. The internal and external dynamics of recent 
months have ushered in an air of optimism that the crisis will soon be overcome. 
On the internal front, numerous processes have progressed to overshadow past 
obstacles. The divisions and proliferations of Darfur movements that followed 
the Abuja Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA, 2005) have finally led to the formation 
of two or three main groups. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) seems 
to have emerged as a clear winner capable of dictating future peace processes. 
The newly formed Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) has also come to 
occupy a prominent role, at least at the political level. The spread of war to the 
Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile Province and the subsequent formation of the 
Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) in February 2012 have added another 
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dimension to the conflict, increasing the likelihood of the collapse of the 
Khartoum government.
The separation of Sudan into two independent countries has further isolated 
President Al Bashir, thus paving the way for compromises on the way to a 
peaceful resolution of the Darfur conflict. The newly independent Republic of 
South Sudan has already signalled its readiness to play an active role in bringing 
the conflict to an end. But the new country did not emerge without economic 
implications. It now includes 80% of Sudan’s oil reserves, thus robbing Khartoum 
of necessary funds for running the war. Khartoum simply has not enough cash 
to sustain its war in Darfur as can be readily deduced from the near collapse of 
the Sudanese pound.
The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictment of Al Bashir on 4 March 
2009 and again in July 2009 has certainly shaken the delicate Darfur peace 
process but has equally sent shockwaves across African and Arab leaderships. The 
indictment signalled a historic new era that challenges the impunity of sitting 
dictators against international prosecutions. Much more pertinent here is the 
impact of the indictment within the ranks of the ruling National Congress Party 
(NCP) of Sudan. While the indictment gave the hardliners cause to rally around 
the beleaguered president, dissent has emerged among moderate party members 
concerned about the future prospects of their party. As an ICC spokesperson 
indicated on 4 May 2009, some members of the government of Sudan intimated 
their desire to hand over Al Bashir to the ICC (Alwafd, 2009).
Dealing with Darfur war crimes
Whether peace in Darfur is imminent or not remains open to debate. What 
is certain is that the sustainability of peace in Darfur and the guarantee of 
harmonious post-conflict coexistence require careful handling of Darfur war 
crimes. Despite ample international attention being paid to atrocities committed 
in Darfur, there is little consensus regarding the number of fatalities, the 
incidence of rape, the extent of villages burnt and property destroyed or looted. 
Rough estimates give figures of 200 000 to 500 000 killed, 2.5 million displaced, 
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5 000 villages destroyed and 10 000 women raped (Suleiman, 2011; El-Tom, 
2007). However, and by whatever measures, the atrocities committed involve 
numbers that far exceed the capacity of formal legal systems to handle. In this 
regard, we have a great deal to learn from other similar conflicts in the Sudan 
as well as in other African countries. Thus we have the war of South Sudan, the 
Rwandan experience, the South African experience and many others. 
In approaching Darfur war crimes, Sudan must learn from mistakes committed 
at the Naivasha negotiations that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA), which paved the way for independence of the South. In Naivasha, the 
negotiators adopted the dictum of ‘forgive and march on’ and opted for a blanket 
amnesty for all north-south civil war criminals. Eminent Sudanese lawyer Magdi 
Algazouli maintains that the ‘failure to probe into atrocities committed in the 
GoS-SPLM war encouraged a repeat of the same crimes in Darfur and a blanket 
amnesty in the Darfur war is simply untenable’ (Algazouli, 2009). While it was 
difficult to account for every atrocity committed during the Sudanese north-
south conflict, failing to raise the issue of justice has come with a considerable 
price. As Amnesty International aptly put it, ‘peace depends not only on absence 
of war but also on the existence of both justice and truth, with both justice and 
truth depending on one another’ (Amnesty International, 2002b). The ICC has 
already issued arrest warrants for seven individuals: President Al Bashir, Minister 
Abdel Rahim Husain, Governor Ahmed Haroun, Janjaweed leader Kushayb and 
three rebel leaders, one of whom was later cleared by ICC judges. This number is 
small compared to the unofficial list of 55 culprits whom Human Rights Watch 
wants investigated (HRW, 2005). The government itself has followed suit and 
claims it has commuted death sentences on 36 soldiers charged with committing 
atrocities and armed robberies in Darfur. Thus the process of accountability 
has already started and it is difficult and perhaps undesirable to reverse. Given 
the scale of crimes committed in Darfur, the ICC and Sudan’s National Justice 
System (NJS) will not have the capacity to deal with all cases within a time frame 
that is fair and just for victims and culprits alike. It is here that Darfur must 
learn from the Rwandan experience. Needless to say, the current NJS is not fit to 
deliver justice. This embarrassing fact is also highlighted by the AU High-Level 
Panel on Darfur (AUPD), headed by Thabo Mbeki, the former President of 
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South Africa. The High-Level Panel Report recommends use of Hybrid Courts, 
a revamped NJS with the participation of foreign judges (AUPD, 2009). 
In attempting to make use of the Rwandan experience in Darfur, one must pay 
close attention to similarities and commonalities between the two cases. To 
begin with, there is clear difference of scale whereby the Rwandan case dwarfs 
the level of crimes committed in Darfur. While the Rwandan case presents a 
clear case of genocide, the legal definition of Darfur atrocities as genocide is 
fraught with controversies and will remain so until the final ruling of the ICC. 
Suffice to say that Al Bashir is charged on 11 counts including genocide in the 
ICC rulings of 4 March and 20 July 2010.
The Rwandan case involved a massacre of close to one million victims out of 
a population of 10 million (Hansen, 2005:1). In Darfur, confusion still reigns 
regarding the number of casualties, with fatalities falling anywhere between 
200 000 and 500 000 out of a population of 7.5 million (Suleiman, 2011). The 
government of Sudan reduces this estimate even further to no more than 10 000. 
Needless to say, few outside government circles take this last estimate with any 
degree of seriousness.1
In the Rwandan case, killing and other atrocities were predominantly executed 
by community members known to their victims. In sharp contrast, Darfur war 
crimes are predominantly perpetuated by the official army aided by militia allies 
locally known as Janjaweed. While many of the Janjaweed are local and hence 
known to their victims, some are imported from outside Sudan and cannot be 
easily identified by survivors. Army soldiers implicated in Darfur war crimes are 
much more difficult to identify as they are imported from outside the region. 
The government of Sudan has also used intensive aerial bombardment carried 
out by pilots who cannot be easily identified. 
At a different level, both the Rwandan case and its Darfur counterpart have 
been driven by the motive of effecting a population reshuffle, involving varying 
degrees of ethnic cleansing. The Hutu génocidaires of Rwanda, alluding to their 
so-called Hutu Ten Commandments, declared their Tutsi fellow citizens as 
1  For the Rwandan genocide see: Gourevitch, 1998; Dallaire, 2004; Prunier, 1995.
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inyenzi, meaning  ‘cockroaches’, ‘which could only be cured by extermination’. 
Darfur gangsters declared their victims as slaves, mercenaries and agents of 
Christian crusaders. Dehumanisation of would-be victims has been central to 
genocides, ethnic cleansing and massacres across the world. In Brazil, street 
children destined for killing are referred to as vermin. In other countries from 
Asia to Europe and Latin America, those who are destined for annihilation are 
referred to variously as infidels, enemies of the nation, nits, garbage, beasts, 
vagabonds, or subhumans (Jones, 2006:334). These terms are used in an effort 
to reduce the assailants’ guilt, galvanise support, ‘humanise’ and ‘glamorise’ 
killings of people and deprive victims of any chance for sympathy and 
humane treatment. 
We must therefore readily admit that dealing with Darfur war crimes presents a 
daunting problem that requires an unconventional response at the post-conflict 
phase of crisis. The Rwandan case provides a template that can be followed in 
Darfur in the near future. Like Rwanda, and if the wise option of prosecution 
is to be pursued, Darfur culprits will far exceed the capacity of Sudan’s NJS and 
the ICC put together. The UN Security Council’s trials formed for Rwanda 
came to be known as the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR). 
In the case of Rwanda, and with nearly one million killed, it was estimated that 
the country had 125 000 suspected killers, forming 6% of its population. That 
number computes at eight to nine victims per killer. Other crimes like rape, 
looting, injuries and the burning of property also entered into the equation. 
Thus, when the genocide ended, Rwanda had 130 000 prisoners awaiting trial 
for alleged serious crimes only, but the options were limited.
The ICTR concerned itself with what has come to be referred to as Category 
One criminals, namely those who were allegedly implicated at the organisational 
level of the genocide. Altogether, 400 suspected génocidaires were identified. 
Many of them fled and remained in western countries with little or no chance 
of repatriation. The dubiously slow pace of ICTR trials provided another 
problem. By 2012, the ICTR listed 69 cases completed with 10 acquittals (ICTR, 
2012). Different sources credit the ICTR with a mere 33 cases after 14 years 
of investigation, ending in 2008. However, the restricted mandate of the ICC 
relegates the institution to a limited role in the overall post-conflict justice 
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system (Lawson, 2005; Gusongoirye, 2008). According to some critics, the ICTR 
was plagued with corruption, nepotism, mismanagement and malfunctioning 
(Power, 2003:495; Shawn, 2006).
As for the Rwandan national legal system, it is certainly more efficient in 
comparison to the ICTR but equally hopeless in the face of the genocide. 
From 1996 to 2006, the national courts were able to handle a mere 10 000 
trials. With that rate, the national courts would require over 100 years to 
prosecute all prisoners (Gusongoirye, 2008; Kasaija, 2009). Rwanda has been 
most unfortunate with regard to near decimation of its legal system during 
the genocide. It experienced a loss of over 80% of its legal officials and many 
legal facilities were damaged during the genocide. For example, only 244 judges 
survived the genocide from a total number of 750 (Hansen, 2005:2). Darfur fares 
much better in this regard. There is no summary execution of judges in Darfur 
and the region can, if necessary, draw on legal officials from outside Darfur. But 
the Rwandan case was different. The country simply had no choice but search in 
its traditional system for a solution. Gacaca seemed to be a logical path for the 
country to follow. 
Gacaca, meaning ‘sitting on grass’ or also ‘lawn-justice’ is a quintessential 
traditional Rwandese institution for conflict resolution. By its very nature, 
a Gacaca court can be formed in any community to mediate and impose 
penalties on wrongdoers. Gacaca depends on moral force to implement its 
rulings. However, these are heavily backed by the threat of the much harsher 
national legal system. This often remains open for the plaintiff in cases where the 
Gacaca rulings are rejected. Recognising the vastness of the number of prisoners 
awaiting trial following the 1994 genocide, the Government of Rwanda adapted 
the Gacaca, with some modification, to serve as an alternative legal system. 
Gacaca was to deal with the milder but more numerous crimes committed 
during the genocide. Four categories of crimes were identified, with Gacaca 
restricted to categories 2-4:
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Table 1: Genocide Crime Categories
Category One Planning, organisation, instigation, supervision  
of genocide
Category Two Physical attacks resulting in death
Category Three Physical attacks not resulting in death 
Category Four Looting, theft, property damage 
Source: Adapted from Musoni (2009).
Gacaca is constituted of four hierarchical levels. Starting from the lowest, 
Gacaca has cell, sector, district and provincial tribunals. Cell tribunals deal with 
property offences, sector tribunals with injuries, and district tribunals with 
killing but not its organisation. Provincial tribunals are reserved to act as final 
appeal courts for Gacaca cases.
The power of Gacaca resides in its capacity for speedy constitution. This is 
demonstrated by the appointment of 266 000 Gacaca judges in 2001, the same 
year the Gacaca Act was issued (Amnesty International, 2002a). By the time 
Gacaca heard its last case in July 2010, it had examined over 1.5 million cases. 
Some estimated 5 000 remaining prisoners who were too old or sick to stand 
trial and were implicated in minor offences were pardoned (Musoni, 2009; 
Vesperini, 2010).
Despite its limitations, some of which are outlined later in this article, the 
achievements of Gacaca courts have been impressive. A pertinent question 
here is how can Darfur replicate its success while at the same time avoid its 
limitations?2 Like Rwanda, Darfur has traditional systems of conflict settlement 
which can be activated in its post-conflict work. In the following paragraphs, 
I will draw on the experience of the Berti, my own ethnic group, and use it 
as a convenient model for Darfur. The reader must allow for minor variations 
among other ethnic groups (for the Berti see Holy, 1974, 1991; El-Tom, 2008).
2 For a critique of Gacaca see Amnesty International, 2002a, 2002b; Haile, 2008.
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Darfur’s legal system of traditional administration
Across the Sudan, local administration operates a sophisticated judicial system 
premised on traditional wisdom but equally informed by a modern state’s legal 
ethos. Courts of local administration are structured around their administrative 
role. The village sheikh constitutes the lowest level of local administration 
presiding over 10 to 40 households. The village sheikh has no physical court but 
is mandated to settle minor disputes. In addition, the village sheikh combines 
assisting traditional courts run by his superiors in the local administration and 
government legal courts. 
Above the village sheikh is the Omda (Mayor) who presides over up to 100 
sheikhs. Depending on the size of the territory under his administration, 
the Omda may or may not have a physical court. Like the village sheikh, the 
Omda settles minor disputes among sheikhs as well as individuals. The 
absence of a court also means the absence of a mandate to impose prison 
sentences. Minor fines and compensation may be imposed during arbitration 
although implementation of the ruling depends on the disposition of the 
conflicting parties.
Above the Omda is the Shartay who presides over three to six Omdas. The 
Shartay has a court and mandate to impose jail sentences to be served in 
government prisons. He receives a salary from the government and maintains 
court records for future examination by the government if required. Above the 
Shartay is the Nazir or king in some areas. Both the Nazir and king run courts 
that are endorsed and supervised by the government.
Despite its history and experience, the traditional administration is unlikely to 
be suitable for post-crisis trials in Darfur. To begin with, this system is ethnically 
based and always headed by a chief of the dominant ethnic group in the area. 
Although the court might include juries drawn from ethnic minorities in the 
area, the position of the chief belongs to the dominant ethnic group. This makes 
adapting such a court to run trials of Darfur war criminals a risky affair. Moreover, 
many of these chiefs have also been politicised and above all implicated in one 
way or another in the Darfur dispute. Removing them in favour of other judges 
might create a dilemma regarding other functions for which they have been 
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appointed in the first place. For these reasons, it would be unwise to solicit their 
involvement in post-crisis trials. 
Collective compensation (Diya)
Diya is a traditional system of collective compensation employed across 
Sudan and other African countries such as Somalia and Chad. In Darfur, it is 
restricted with some flexibility to unintentional homicide, injuries and damage 
to property. In order to seek the assistance of the kinship group to pay Diya, 
the compensation required must be too large for a single household to muster. 
In effect, this is a collective responsibility for individual offences. Nonetheless, 
and like many other traditional systems of conflict resolution, Diya constitutes 
a process for collective action and periodic consolidation of group solidarity. 
A network of permanent officers is elected to administer Diya. They 
form hierarchical lines of personnel chosen on a hereditary basis with the 
sole role of operating the Diya. Ethnic groups are divided into lineages 
(Khashim biout) and sub-lineages (Warrayat) with a person in charge of the 
collection of contributions for each division or sub-division.
The Berti, whose system is described below, is a good example. It is a system 
common in Darfur but not without some variations. At the apex of the structure 
of Diya sits the Farsha who covers a large territory for the group. Below the 
Farsha is the Duwana who is responsible for the mobilisation and collection 
of contributions of several lineages. Up to 50 lineages could come under a 
Duwana consisting of more than 10 000 households. Each lineage is under 
a Dimlig who is appointed for the same purpose. The Farsha, Duwana and 
Dimlig have deputies spread across all areas where they have relatives, including 
in the capital Khartoum. Diya representatives may seek assistance from the local 
administration to execute their work as the latter recognises and fully supports 
the Diya system as a legitimate course of conflict settlement.
Payment of Diya  is worked out by dividing the amount of imposed compensation 
by the number of contributing households. Due to the spread of population, the 
collection of money is an arduous and inefficient task requiring several years to 
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complete. Payments are relatively small due to the large number of contributors. 
For example, homicide triggers a levy of as a low as LS100 (Sudanese Pound), 
approximately 0.30 Euro per household, with only married people eligible for 
contribution. Payment of Diya is seen as an honourable deed, symbolic of 
belonging to the group. Few are prepared to endure the shame of not meeting 
the obligation.
Although the Diya is theoretically restricted to unintentional offences, it is often 
extended to cater for crimes of collective aims that are deliberately committed. 
Crimes committed to advance the cause of a group constitute a breach of 
national legal codes but there are always ways around these. In ethnic disputes 
where intentional killings are committed, the government itself ignores national 
justice codes and resorts to Diya to settle conflicts. The sophisticated outreach 
of the Diya institution coupled with sanctioned flexibility makes it a perfect 
candidate for use in the post-Darfur conflict.
Traditional councils of mediation (The Judiyya)
When thinking of Gacaca, nothing comes to mind in Darfur other than its 
traditional mediation council, locally referred to as the Judiyya. It is a grassroots 
system of arbitration that focuses on reconciliation and resurrection of social 
relationships in the community. Unlike other judicial systems such as government 
and Shartay courts, the Judiyya is distinguished by the impermanency of its 
membership, informality and accessibility to all in the community. 
The Judiyya session can be initiated by a plaintiff, a defendant or their concerned 
neighbours and relatives. The meeting is open to all including passing guests 
and is not restricted to any defined number of mediators. In general, a Judiyya 
session attracts a minimum of five jurors who join and depart at will to carry out 
other activities. The disputants have the right to veto participation of potential 
mediators but only prior to commencement of the Judiyya. 
The Judiyya has no overt power to enforce its ruling. Its power over disputants is 
moral. A disputant who defies the ruling of the Judiyya is castigated as a Kassar 
Khawatir (consensus breaker) who is anti-social, uncooperative and a threat 
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to community harmony. The opposite of that is Jabbar Khawatir (consensus 
builder), reflecting civility and ideal citizenship in the community. In a social 
environment where survival requires cooperation, the label of ‘consensus 
breaker’ is hard to sustain. Furthermore, the ruling of the Judiyya is often 
endorsed by the much harsher Shartay court should the case go further. What 
is important here is the consensual nature of Judiyya ruling. In effect, it is a 
community attempt to combine individual interests with community ideals.
The Judiyya is free and no penalties are imposed other than compensation for 
loss or damage incurred in the conflict. An oath on the Koran may be employed 
to prevent further offences between the disputants. 
The Judiyya versus the Shartay court
As mentioned above, the Shartay runs a court that is endorsed by the state. 
The Shartay court deals with intermediary conflicts and is subordinate to 
government courts. The Judiyya then occupies the lower level of jurisprudence 
and is confined to lower level crimes that may not require intervention by the 
Shartay court. In contrast to the Judiyya, the Shartay court mimics its superior 
government courts. It is informed by a modern ethos, literate and with permanent 
members. It is also punitive and dependent on external tools like bailiffs, police 
and prisons to enforce its verdicts. Its sessions are formally planned and held 
in modern buildings in the form of mud rooms as distinct from grass cottages. 
The Judiyya contrasts sharply with this. It is grassroots-based, spontaneous, 
with an open jury and focussed on reconciliation. Its meetings are convened in 
any suitable place, like the shade of a tree, and it relies on the goodwill of the 
parties involved to enforce its rulings (see Tables 2 and 3).
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Table 2: The Judiyya and the Shartay Court
Judiyya Shartay  Court
Tree Mud room
Oral/traditional-based Literate/modern-based
Spontaneous Formally arranged
Open jury Restricted jury
Restitutive Punitive
Moral enforcement External enforcement
Ruling consensual Ruling imposed by judges
Table 3: Traditional System of Conflict Resolution
Domain Mandate/Powers
Election/ 
Appointment
Judiyya
Neighbourhood  
conflicts
Restitution and  
reconciliation
Spontaneous
Sheikh
Single village  
or residential 
quarter
Small fines, communal  
work, tax
Locally elected
Omda
Several sheikhs,  
up to 100
Small fines, tax Elected/appointed
Shartay Several Omdas
Up to two years jail 
sentence; extension of 
official legal system, tax
Elected/appointed
Farsha
An area or  
sub-tribe;  
Duwanas
Collection of  
compensation  
fund only
Elected
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From Gacaca of Rwanda to the Judiyya of Darfur
Like pre-genocide Gacaca, the Judiyya is a quintessential institution and a 
repository of a traditional system evolved for tackling day-to-day conflicts 
during peaceful times. As in post-genocide Rwanda, the Darfur crisis introduced 
fresh nuances and new realities that transcend the traditional competence of the 
Judiyya. Hence, there is a need for some modification to Judiyya with the aim 
of its transformation into an institution capable of contributing to justice and 
reconciliation in post-war Darfur. Fortunately Gacaca provides an impeccable 
template whereby a basically similar institution has been called upon to play a 
role analogous to what is demanded of the Judiyya. In revising the Judiyya to 
suit the new context of post-war Darfur, caution is necessary to avoid the pitfalls 
of the Gacaca. The new Judiyya will undoubtedly be a hybrid, defying purists 
of traditional customs and disappointing those who aspire to an unadulterated 
modern judicial system. 
Navigating through the complexities of the number of perpetrators of Darfur 
atrocities represents a major challenge. Even if we are able to gauge a reasonable 
margin of error, the number of those implicated in the atrocities will still be 
affected by local considerations peculiar to Darfur. By June 2009, Gacaca had 
already delivered over 1.5 million cases (Musoni, 2009). Roughly speaking, 
and assuming that many of Darfur offenders cannot be identified, the Judiyya 
will still probably have to deal with a fourth to fifth of that number (200 000 
to 375 000). This number is further reduced by removing those involved in 
homicide/fatal injuries, as will be proposed later. The challenge is formidable but 
not insurmountable.
In the Gacaca case, 266 000 judges were appointed to sit in 10 000 courts. While 
this number may seem vast, the courts had to deal with a colossal amount 
of work with an adverse effect on performance, enthusiasm and availability 
for economic activities. The Judiyya must avoid this pitfall. If the number of 
Gacaca courts is used as a template, Darfur will require 2 000 to 2 500 courts. 
The problem of excessive work experienced in Gacaca can be eliminated by 
doubling the number of Judiyya courts to 4 000 to 5 000. This will also speed up 
112
Abdullahi Osman El-Tom
the work, fast-track the reduction of the number of detainees and lead to a more 
efficient reconciliation and reconstruction of communities. 
The poor training of judges that accompanied the work of the Gacaca courts 
must not be repeated in Darfur. As reported, Gacaca judges received an 
average of 36 hours of training each (Haile, 2008:20; Hansen, 2005:2; Amnesty 
International, 2002b:6). Moreover, judges sitting on Gacaca Appeal Tribunals 
did not receive better or longer training than other trainees. This deficiency 
must be overcome in Darfur. The quality of training must not be sacrificed 
for expediency.
Amnesty International was justified in raising the issue of the failure of 
Gacaca to adhere to the principle of a fair trial in its proceedings (Amnesty 
International, 2002a). Like many traditional legal systems, Gacaca lacked what is 
akin to the modern principle of ‘presumption of innocence’. This principle must 
be enshrined into the revamped Judiyya if it is to deliver justice that is worthy 
of pursuit. 
The Judiyya also lacks a space for lawyers, a pitfall experienced in Gacaca. While 
it may not be feasible to include lawyers in the Judiyya, this shortcoming can 
be addressed by boosting the role of counter witnesses. Defendants should 
be allowed to commission relatives who are more articulate and with a better 
command of the intricacies of local jurisprudence to represent them in courts. It 
is perhaps unrealistic and albeit unnecessary to replicate Rwanda’s employment 
of ‘judicial defenders’ in trials. Judicial defenders are pseudo-lawyers with six 
months of training. Nonetheless, some form of training for ‘traditional judicial 
defenders’ with the aim of improving their sense of justice should be considered 
(Amnesty International, 2002b).
Many experts including Hansen (2005), Haile (2008) and Emmanuel (2007) 
have raised concerns about the low, if not totally defective, standard of evidence 
employed in Gacaca. The result was that many defendants were convicted on 
the basis of hearsay and circumstantial proof. Care must be given to this issue 
in the training of Judiyya judges. Judiyya appeal tribunals in particular must 
be empowered and perhaps augmented with modern judges to attenuate this 
tendency in the Judiyya. Alternatively, a supreme appeal tribunal can be created 
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within a reorganised national justice system to act as a final stop for contested 
Judiyya verdicts. Variations in standards of the law of evidence are not peculiar 
to traditional legal systems. As the trials of O. J. Simpson have shown, modern 
courts are also inconsistent in their application of the law of evidence. Simpson 
was pronounced ‘not guilty’ in a criminal court but later convicted in a civil 
court. Simpson’s case is said to have inspired relatives of the 29 victims of the 
Omagh bombing in Northern Ireland by the Real IRA in 1998. Having failed to 
secure a conviction in a criminal court in 2001, the plaintiffs renewed their case 
under a civil court, leading to a successful conclusion on 8 June 2009. Four of the 
five defendants were found responsible for the Omagh atrocities. The civil court 
prosecution highlights the marked differences where ‘in a civil case, the burden 
of proof is on the balance of probabilities rather than the higher burden of a 
criminal case of beyond reasonable doubt’ (Coulter and Keenan, 2009; Coulter 
2009a, 2009b). 
Improving the justice potential of the Judiyya presupposes some degree of 
modernisation, bringing the institution closer to international justice system. In 
so doing, efforts must be made to avoid converting the Judiyya into a retributive 
system akin to modern courts. The value of the Judiyya lies in its drive for 
restitution and reconciliation. Pushing the Judiyya too much into the realm of 
modern courts with their emphasis on punishment would be imprudent and 
counterproductive (Shema, 2009). The challenge is how to improve the justice 
delivery of Judiyya while maintaining at least some of its traditional ethos. 
Despite the scale of atrocities in Darfur, it is anticipated that the Judiyya will face 
less work as compared to Gacaca. Hence, overseers of the Judiyya can afford to 
limit its deliberations to relatively minor offences. All crimes leading to fatalities 
can be removed from Judiyya jurisdiction and be transferred to the NJS. Cases 
of rape should also be taken out of the Judiyya. The gravity of war rape is 
demonstrated by its historic classification as a war crime in the ICTR. As such, 
the Judiyya will then be mandated to deal with damage to property including 
theft and looting, non-fatal injuries, and the terrorising and intimidation 
of civilians. 
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There is no doubt that the Darfur crisis represents a conflict between the 
centre and the periphery. Nonetheless, the crisis manifested itself in the region 
pitting one broad coalition of groups against another. This division is bound 
to resonate in the constitution of the Judiyya tribunals. More often than not, 
an administrative territory which constitutes a base for a Judiyya court may 
coincide with a single dominant ethnic group. Judiyya courts must be prevented 
from acting as mechanisms for forwarding the narrow interests of a dominant 
ethnic group to the detriment of others. Hence, modalities guaranteeing a fair 
ethnic mix of Judiyya courts must be envisaged prior to the constitution of these 
courts. This will increase fairness and pre-empt the possibility of the Judiyya 
falling into what Hansen (2005:4) refers to as ‘victor’s justice’.
Blatant interference by the post-genocide Rwandan government is widely 
reported. The government intervened in the mandate of Gacaca, its deliberation 
process, in the availability and release of detainees to be tried and intimidation 
of its judges (Hansen, 2005; Amnesty International, 2002b:6-7). This scenario 
is likely to be attempted by the post-war government in Darfur. Insulation of 
the Judiyya from negative government interference must be ensured and clearly 
embedded in Judiyya rules.
As alluded to before, the Judiyya has evolved to deal with conflicts of peacetime. 
The war in Darfur creates a new context that presents the Judiyya with new 
challenges. One of those is the challenge of having to deal with unconventional 
clients including minors, rape victims and sufferers of post-war trauma. Judiyya 
judges must be trained to isolate these cases and accommodate them in their 
deliberations. But the mere sensitivity of judges to these cases alone is not 
sufficient. A mechanism whereby the Judiyya can make use of trained personnel 
in the areas of post-war trauma, rape problems and minors must be provided. 
Like many traditional settings in Africa, the Judiyya has always been a male 
battlefield. Women feature in it as victims, defendants and witnesses but rarely 
as judges. This patriarchal aspect of the Judiyya must be remedied. The war in 
Darfur did not spare women and there is no reason why they should not make 
a prominent presence in its justice process. Gacaca provides a good template in 
that the participation of women was as high as 30%.
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Concluding remarks
The use of the Judiyya in post-war Darfur is dictated by necessity. The Judiyya 
constitutes the best avenue for generating ownership of justice, achieving 
reconciliation and avoiding the undesirable dilemma of keeping detainees, many 
of whom are innocent, in jail for prolonged periods. Supporters of the South 
African rival ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ model may be content with the fact that 
the main principles of that model are already enshrined in the Judiyya. These 
include the establishment of truth, bringing contenders to face-to-face dialogues, 
the airing of grievances, forgiveness, the moral punishment of wrongdoers and 
above all social rehabilitation (Emmanuel, 2007; Graybill, 2004). 
No matter how the Judiyya is improved, it will not match the fairness of ‘best 
practice’ in modern courts. It is perhaps neither logical nor desirable to adopt 
different processes and expect the same result. Limitations of the Judiyya 
can, however, be compensated for by what the Judiyya delivers for peace and 
reconciliation. I hasten to add here that we have little choice in this regard. 
Replication of the modern justice system under the mantle of the Judiyya serves 
no purpose. Among the other problems that it may create is that it transforms 
the Judiyya into another punitive system with little or no contribution to 
community restitution. Moreover, one should not assume that alternative justice 
systems, in the form of either the national justice system or the international 
justice system, are perfect. Both of these systems have demonstrated their 
limitations across the globe. However, this is not a ground for deciding not to 
use them (Jones, 2006). 
This chapter glosses over several theoretical issues in the study of conflict 
and peacebuilding. Chief amongst these is the legitimacy of armed conflicts 
instigated by both the state and rebel groups. International conventions abhor 
armed conflicts but do not criminalise them as long as they stay clear of non-
combatants, observe the rules of engagement and refrain from the use of 
excessive force. At a theoretical level in anthropology and related disciplines, 
armed conflicts are not seen as inherently negative or positive. In the structural-
functionalist approach, armed conflicts can be interpreted as negative only if 
they do not reinforce the status quo. In the Marxist perspective, physical violence 
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is seen as positive if it leads to progressive change. To this, one may cite Fanon 
and others who take armed violence aimed at decolonisation as necessarily 
positive (Sluka, 1992:30).
The armed conflict which is the subject of this article is aimed at changing the 
status quo and not at upholding it. As the rebels claim, raising arms is by far not 
their preferred choice and has come only after prolonged failures of peaceful 
means of addressing their grievances. Tragically, as Sluka puts it, ‘the rich and 
the powerful are almost never persuaded to change through reasoned argument 
or moral persuasion’ (Sluka, 1992:31). Surprisingly, Al Bashir himself declared 
publicly that he would ‘only negotiate with those with a gun in hand, for that 
was how he took over power in Khartoum’ (El-Tom, 2009:99; Suleiman, 2011). 
There can be no doubt that the current armed conflicts in Darfur resulted in 
a colossal loss of life. However, armed conflicts, including Darfur’s, come as a 
desperate attempt to put an end to structural violence. In Darfur as well as in 
other marginalised regions of Sudan, structural violence perpetrated by the 
Khartoum government since independence has been responsible for millions of 
deaths. People there continue to die due to poverty, disease, famine and neglect 
(Nordstrom and Martin, 2006:8). It is no wonder that Cramer emphasises this 
point by employing the phrase ‘Civil war is not a stupid thing’ as the title of his 
book. He rightly calls for taking wars as central to the process of modernisation 
and away from viewing them as indicative of ‘development in reverse’ 
(Cramer, 2006). 
While successful civil wars may deliver a reprieve from structural violence, peace 
and the peacebuilding process may come at a high cost to their major stakeholders. 
In the currently interconnected world, civil wars often call for international 
sponsored peace initiatives, the details of which are developed from afar, away 
from conflict zones and behind closed doors (MacGinty, 2010:350). This is what 
is also referred to as ‘liberal peace’, a process that remains firmly in the hands of 
the European-North American axis. It aims at articulation of conflict zones in 
the sphere of the western liberal world. Invariably, such liberal peace erodes the 
agency of major stakeholders and weakens their self-determination. Richmond 
refers to this process as ‘dispossession in which agency is taken away from those 
who receive peace’ (Richmond, 2010:4). Over the past few years, Darfur rebel 
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groups have already signed dozens of international charters in the course of 
negotiations, training and consultation with diverse United Nations, INGO and 
civic society institutions. Issues that the rebels signalled their commitment to 
include liberal democracy, human rights, prisoners of war, proscribing child 
soldiers, the equality of women, freedom of speech, and property rights. While 
many of these issues conform to the ideals of the rebel groups, the charters 
nonetheless privilege the Eurocentric self and endorse the otherisation of the 
rest of the world.
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